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Financial and Labor Market Determinants of Mortgage Delinquency Rates:
McLean County, IL, 1985-2011
Jake Mann, Illinois Wesleyan University
1 Introduction
It is generally understood that the 2007-2009 recession in the United States had its roots
in the real estate market. To quote Schiller (2008): “a speculative bubble in the housing market
(...) has now caused ruptures among many other countries in the form of financial failures and a
global credit crunch” (p. 1). There is a growing body of literature on the economic impact of the
bursting of this “speculative bubble”. Efforts have been directed at examining how financial
institutions have been impacted and at considering different efforts to re-regulate this industry.
As the economic recovery from this particular recession has been slower than after previous
contractions, particularly in terms of job creation, research efforts have also focused on labor
markets. In this paper we propose to examine the interplay between financial and labor market
factors and the real estate market at the local level. We study McLean County, Illinois, as this
county, while being the largest in the state in terms of square mileage, has a median income level
and a home ownership rate comparable to those of Cook County –where the City of Chicago is
located.
As Marcano and Ruprah (2011) report, recent economic literature tends to cast the
phenomenon of mortgage default, the precursor to potential property foreclosure, as either an
issue of strategic behavior or as an issue of inability to pay. Regarding the issue of strategic
behavior and mortgage defaults, significant attention has been devoted to the study of why and
when homeowners choose to stop making their monthly mortgage payments. The premise that
homeowners will “walk away” from their properties when the value of the mortgage is greater

than the home price, a situation known as having “negative equity” or “being “underwater”, fits a
crude cost-benefit analysis of such a situation. Yet, Foote et al. (2008) find that “contrary to
popular belief, […] negative equity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for foreclosure”
(p. 1). In fact, they report that fewer than 10 percent of homeowners experiencing negative
equity on their homes eventually experience foreclosure.
Moreover, Mian and Sufi (2008) place the onus of foreclosures on the lenders, as “the
expansion in the supply of credit driven by disintermediation is responsible for the rapid increase
in new loan originations, house price appreciation, and subsequent large increase in default
rates” (p. 4). Similar conclusions regarding lending standards and mortgage securitization are
reached by Nadauld and Sherlund (2009), Haughwout et al. (2008), and Keys et al. (2008). The
prevalence of adjustable-rate mortgage instruments during the build-up of the housing bubble
also played a central factor in the buildup of negative equity. As Bucks et al. (2008) point out,
borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages were much more likely to misunderstand the terms of
their mortgage contract than their peers. Particularly, they were “likely to underestimate or to not
know how much their interest rates could change” (p. 1).
Regarding the issue of inability to pay and mortgage defaults, research efforts have been
focused on identifying the factors that prevent the homeowners from making their monthly
payments. Such factors can be broadly categorized as either financial (e.g. interest rates on the
mortgaged principal) or labor-market related (e.g. the employment status of the homeowner).
Previous real estate market crises informed the work of Campbell and Dietrich (1983) and
Deboer and Conrad (1988), who found that unemployment rates are positively related to
mortgage and property tax delinquency levels respectively. More recently, Mayer et al. (2009)
find that “In areas with widespread increases in unemployment, house prices generally decline;
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demand for housing falls as income drops and workers migrate to other areas in search of jobs”
(p. 42). Financial factors have also been considered. Gerardi et al. (2007) estimation results
indicate that the short-term London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and unemployment rate are
positively associated with foreclosure levels. Also, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) find that
at the outset of the 2006-2007 housing crisis the delinquency rate on fixed-rate mortgages
actually fell and that the ‘variable’ delinquency rate rose enough to cause a cumulative increase
in the aggregate delinquency rate.
We focus our study on the arguments related to the inability to pay, rather than on the
moral hazard argument, in order to address an ongoing public policy argument: whether
mortgage defaults are more strongly influenced by the weakness in the labor market or by the
actual costs of financing the mortgages. The policy implications of this argument are enormous.
If the costs of mortgages is found to be more relevant than, let’s say, the unemployment rate in
explaining mortgage defaults, policy efforts should be focused on facilitating debt re-financing;
if the inverse is true, policy efforts should prioritize job-creation to stem the mortgage defaults
and foreclosures. Cordell et al. (2008) offer their own answer to this question when reporting
that the “deadweight losses” derived from foreclosures could be reduced with “loss mitigation”
(i.e. re-financing).
We expect that an increase in either fixed or variable interest rates decreases
homeowners’ ability to make their mortgage payments, thus increasing delinquency
rates. Changes in fixed and variable mortgage interest rates should impact homeowners in
slightly different ways. A change in the fixed interest rate will only affect newly granted fixedrate mortgages for either the acquisition of a new house or for the refinancing of the current one.
Homeowners already locked-in with a fixed rate and not looking into re-financing would not be
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affected. A change in the variable interest rate, however, affects the current cost of financing a
house purchase financed through a variable interest instrument. We also expect that a
deterioration of the general condition of the local labor market decreases homeowners’ ability to
make their mortgage payments, thus increasing delinquency rates. An increase in the local
unemployment rate would signal a decrease in the current average income from labor.
We focus our study on the McLean County housing market because it could be
representative of statewide trends. With a population of nearly 170,000 residents, mostly
concentrated in the adjacent City of Bloomington and Town of Normal, nearly 275,000 mortgage
deeds have been granted over the past 26 years. During most of our period of analysis, 19852011, the mortgage delinquency rate has wandered around a mean value of 2.00 percent; yet
starting in 2005 it began to grow, peaking at a value above 9.00 percent in 2010. The
metropolitan unemployment rate has also been increasing and the regional mortgage financing
costs have been at, or above, national averages. As mentioned above, the County has a housing
market fairly representative of the rest of the state. To begin with, it contains well defined and
distinct urban and a rural “submarkets”. Also, the county’s average population per household
(2.46) and homeownership rate (67.70 percent) are within a five percent margin of the national
average values.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and
methodology, examining the stationarity of the series; Section 3 identifies the best-fitting linear
regressions used to examine the behavior of mortgage delinquency rates, discussing our findings;
lastly, Section 4 presents conclusions and outlines policy implications.
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2 Data and Methodology
In McLean County, mortgage delinquencies are registered through the issuances of a lis
pendens, which are notices informing the grantee of a mortgage that the grantor's payments are
90 days past due. These notices are filed with the County’s Recorder’s Office and are accessible
through an online database. By dividing the number of lis pendens filings by the total number of
mortgage deeds issued, the monthly delinquency rate is computed. Our sample period starts in
January 1985 and ends in December 2011: a total of 310 observations. Our sample period
contains a total of 274,310 mortgage deeds and 5,887 lis pendens, resulting in an average
delinquency rate of 2.15 percent. As seen in Figure 1, the series displays a period of relative
stability between 1985 and 2004, when the monthly delinquency rate oscillates between 1.50 and
2.00 percent. The evolution of the twelve-month moving average of the mortgage delinquency
rate suggests a change in the long-term trend by the end of 2005.
National interest rates are obtained from the FRED database maintained by the St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank. These rates represent an average of the borrowing costs in the United
States. Regional interest rates are obtained from the primary Mortgage Market Survey conducted
by the federal agency Freddie Mac. These rates represent borrowing costs within the North
Central region, comprising the states of Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Iowa, North Dakota and South Dakota. We compile both the 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage
Average and the 1-Year Adjustable Rate Average. Figure 2 compares national and regional fixed
interest rates. Figure 3 compares national and regional variable rates. In both cases, secular
declining trends are easily observable. Although the fixed rate is generally higher than the
variable rate, this difference has ebbed and flowed dramatically in the last decade. In fact, during
the most recent recession both rates were effectively identical.
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In our sample period regional fixed interest rates have been an average of 0.06 percentage
points above the national value. Similarly, regional variable interest rates have exceeded national
values by an average of 0.15 percent. In December 2011, the end of our sample, the national
fixed rate rested at 3.96 percent while the national variable rate was 2.79 percent. In this same
month, the regional fixed rate was 3.97 percent while the regional variable rate was 3.06 percent.
Labor market indicators for McLean County are obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Metropolitan Area Survey. The compiled series, the unemployment rate and the
number of unemployed workers, display similar cyclical behavior. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show
that both labor market indicators declined between 1990 and 2000, with the unemployment rate
reaching a low of 2.2 percent in 1998. Increasing, afterward, the unemployment rate peaked at
5.2 percent in 2005 before declining once again –this time to 3.9 percent in 2007. The latest
nation-wide economic contraction has brought the county-level unemployment rate to its highest
in 20 years: 9.1 percent.
In order to determine what structural relationship may link financial and labor market
variables with the mortgage delinquency rate, we will estimate several linear regression models
through Ordinary Least Squares. First, we will study the impact of labor and financial variables
on mortgage delinquency rate separately and then we will combine them into a single regression
equation. The first step in our model-building effort is to determine the order of integration of
each series: if a series is integrated of order zero, I(0), it follows that it is stationary in levels.
We compute the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic to determine the presence
of a unit root in the series. Following econometric convention, we first compute the natural
logarithmic value of the series in order to induce linearity. Table 1 reports the results of the ADF
tests of the variables in log-levels (top section) and in first-order differences of the log-levels
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(bottom section). Except in the case of the mortgage delinquency rate we fail to reject the null
hypothesis that any of the series in log-levels has a unit root within a 95 percent confidence
interval. We will put forward the argument that the pseudo-stationary behavior of the mortgage
delinquency rate between 1985 and 2005 influences the value of the ADF test statistic for the
whole sample period. When the first-order differences of the log-level values are considered the
reported ADF test statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in
any of the series. Thus, we conclude that all the series are integrated of order one, I(1), and that
they should be incorporated into our subsequent regression efforts in terms of growth rates.
In order to check the robustness of our findings we also compute the KwiatkowskiPhillips-Schmidt-Shim (KPSS) test statistic to directly ascertain the potential stationarity of the
series. Table 2 reports the results of the KPSS tests of the variables in log-levels (top section) and
in first-order differences of the log-levels (bottom section). In the case of the mortgage
delinquency rate and the labor market indicators we strongly reject the null hypothesis that, in
log-levels, these series are stationary; in the case of the financial market indicators we fail to
reject the null hypothesis of stationarity within a 95 percent confidence interval. When the firstorder differences of the log-level values are considered the reported KPSS test statistics allow us
not to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity for all the series. As above, we conclude that all
the series are integrated of order one, I(1), and that they should be incorporated into our
subsequent regression efforts in terms of growth rates.

3 Estimation Results
We now turn to estimating a structural model of county-level mortgage delinquency rates
as a function of labor and financial market factors. We study each of these sets of factors
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separately and then combine them in order to present the best-fitting linear regression model. We
employ an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology to estimate the parameters of these
families of models. Our first set of estimating equations relates the mortgage delinquency rate
with labor market factors. Besides the growth rate in the number of unemployed workers and the
growth rate in the unemployment rate we considered the growth rate in the number of employed
workers as a potential explanatory variable. Because none of our estimation formulations
including this last variable yielded any significant result we chose not to include this equation in
our discussion of results.
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Model A and Model B. In both models we
incorporate a lagged (t-1) value of the dependent variable as an independent variable in order to
capture the concept of persistence in the behavior of mortgage delinquency rates. The regression
parameter associated with this variable is highly significant and almost identical across model
specifications. Its negative sign indicates that an increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency
rate during any given month is followed the next month by a decrease (increase) in the mortgage
delinquency rate. For example, when the mortgage delinquency rate increases by 10 percent
during the previous month we should expect a 3.63 (on average) percentage decrease in its value
this month. Thus, the mortgage delinquency rate does not increase continually.
We also include a dummy variable in order to capture an abnormally large drop in the
value of the mortgage delinquency rate during the early months of 1992: during the first quarter
of the year the number of recorded lis pendens notices was less than three a month. We attribute
these low values to either a clerical issue related to the recording the notices or to a possible
change in the legal process regarding the issuing of a lis pendens notice itself. The parameter
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associated with this dummy variable is highly significant and, as should be expected, negative in
sign.
Model A examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage delinquency rate
and the metropolitan area unemployment rate. Due to the delay between the time a homeowner
becomes unemployed and the time a mortgage is considered to be in default – recall that in the
State of Illinois a mortgage is in default after 90 days of non-payments – we lag this variable by
four (4) periods. The regression parameter associated with this variable is highly significant and
positive in sign. We find that a one percent increase (decrease) in the unemployment rate four
months ago translates into a 0.70 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate
during the current month.
Lastly, Model B examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage
delinquency rate and the metropolitan area number of unemployed individuals. For the same
reasons discussed above, we lag this variable by four (4) periods. The regression parameter
associated with this variable is highly significant and positive in sign. We find that a one percent
increase (decrease) in the number of unemployed individuals four months ago translates into a
0.76 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month. We
hypothesize that a change in the number of unemployed workers has a larger impact on the
mortgage delinquency rate than a change in the unemployment rate due to the structure of the
local labor market.
Due to the limited range of horizontal mobility in terms of potential employers in the
county we expect that when a worker becomes unemployed she or he leaves the area in order to
become occupied in a similar activity. Thus, when the actual number of unemployed workers
residing in the area increases its impact on mortgage delinquency rates is larger than that of an
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identical increase in the area unemployment rate. The explanatory power of our linear regression
efforts focused on labor market factors yield very similar R-squares: we explain (on average) 23
percent of the variance in the rate of growth of the delinquency rate. The residual diagnostics
yield mixed results. Although we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in
the residuals, we cannot conclude definitely that the regression residuals are not autocorrelated or
that they are normally distributed.
Our second set of estimating equations relates the mortgage delinquency rate with
national and regional financial market factors. Table 4 presents the estimation results of Model
C and Model D. As before, in both models we incorporate a lagged (t-1) value of the dependent
variable as an independent variable in order to capture the concept of persistence in the behavior
of mortgage delinquency rates. Our findings are almost identical to those presented above and
we will refer the reader to that section of the paper in order to economize space. The dummy
variable discussed above is also incorporated in these models.
Model C examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage delinquency rate
and national-level fixed and variable interest rates. Due to the delay between the time fixed
interest rates change and the time a homeowner notices changes in her or his potential mortgage
financing costs we lag this variable by two (2) periods. The regression parameter associated with
this variable is highly significant and positive in sign. We find that a one percent increase
(decrease) in the national-level fixed interest rate on mortgages two months ago translates into a
2.71 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month.
Somehow surprisingly, we cannot establish any significant statistical relationship
between the national-level variable interest rate on mortgages and the county-level mortgage
delinquency rate. We put forward the hypothesis that the local real estate market, while moving
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along with national trends of ballooning activity between 2003 and 2007, did not share the
“bubble” qualities associated with large volumes of adjustable-rate mortgages prevalent in other
areas. Therefore, only a small fraction of local homeowners was exposed to the variable
financing costs brought about by these financial instruments.
Lastly, Model D examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage
delinquency rate and regional-level fixed and variable interest rates. For the same reasons
discussed above, we lag this variable by two (2) periods. The regression parameter associated
with this variable is highly significant and positive in sign. We find that a one percent increase
(decrease) in the regional-level fixed interest rate on mortgages two months ago translates into a
2.27 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month.
Again, we cannot establish any significant statistical relationship between the variable interest
rate on mortgages and the mortgage delinquency rate, even though in this case we consider
regional-level variable interest rates. We will refer the reader to the argument we put forward
above. The explanatory power of our linear regression efforts focused on financial market factors
yield very similar R-squares: we explain (on average) 21 percent of the variance in the rate of
growth of the delinquency rate. The residual diagnostics yield mixed results. Although we can
strongly reject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in the residuals, we cannot conclude
definitely that the regression residuals are not autocorrelated or that they are normally
distributed.
Our final estimation effort combines labor and financial market factors. Besides the oneperiod lagged value of the growth rate in the mortgage delinquency rate and the event dummy
discussed above we include the growth rates in the regional fixed interest rate on mortgages and
in the area-level number of unemployed. As before, we lag these variables in order to capture the

11

delay in the reaction of the mortgage delinquency rate that follows a change in both labor market
and mortgage financing conditions. The regression parameters associated with these variables are
highly significant and positive in sign. We note that when considered simultaneously the
magnitude of the parameter linking the number of unemployed with the mortgage delinquency
rate increases (by 2.33 percent) while the magnitude of the parameter linking the fixed interest
rate on mortgages with the mortgage delinquency rate decreases (by 17.66 percent).
Nevertheless, the impact of changes in financial factors is 2.38 times larger than the
impact of changes in labor market factors. In fact, a 10 percent increase (decrease) in the fixed
interest rate on mortgages translates into an 18.69 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage
delinquency rate, while a 10 percent increase (decrease) in the number of unemployed
individuals translates into a 7.85 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate.
This regression yields the highest R-square of all of our models: we are able to explain 24
percent of the variance in the rate of growth of the delinquency rate. Finally, the residual
diagnostics yield mixed results. Although we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of
heteroskedasticity in the residuals, we cannot conclude definitely that the regression residuals are
not autocorrelated or that they are normally distributed.

4 Conclusions
Our study of the behavior of the mortgage delinquency rate in McLean County, IL
attempts to explain it as a function of several different factors. We consider, independently and
jointly, labor market indicators such as the number of unemployed and the unemployment rate
and financial market indicators such as the 30-year fixed and 1-year variable mortgage interest
rates. Both national-level and regional-level mortgage interest rates are, alternatively, examined
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as potential explanatory variables. We find that the OLS regression yielding the best overall fit is
capable of explaining 24 percent of the variance in the growth rate of the mortgage delinquency
rate over time. More importantly, we find that when the number of unemployed individuals or
the fixed mortgage interest rate change, even by the same percentage amount, the reaction of the
mortgage delinquency rate is remarkably different in terms of order of magnitude. In our sample
period the impact of changes in financial factors on the county-level mortgage delinquency rate
is 2.38 times larger than the impact of changes in labor market factors.
This empirical finding is potentially useful to address an ongoing local debate on whether
it is the job losses associated with the latest recession or the onerous financing terms of
properties suddenly devaluated by the collapse of the real estate market that is resulting in larger
numbers of mortgage defaults and, eventually, foreclosures. Our conclusion that financial market
indicators play a larger role than labor market indicators could help focus the policy responses to
the ongoing problem of property foreclosures. We will argue that policy efforts in this area
should emphasize loss-mitigation (i.e. refinancing) instead of job-creation.
In that light, we are happy to report that a lender-borrower mediation process has been
recently implemented as part of the legal foreclosure proceedings in the local court system. On
the other hand, our research leads us to believe that recent reductions in the unemployment rate,
both at the national and local levels, would not have as much of a dampening effect on the
number of county-level mortgage defaults as many would expect. Finally, we will point out the
fact that although local and regional policy-makers may be able to influence, to a degree, labor
market conditions in the area their degree of influence over financial market conditions is
severely constrained. In other words, regulation and control of financial market conditions is
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mostly conducted at the national level, where local and regional interests and priorities are
multiple and often conflicting.
In terms of potential avenues of future research we propose to study the time series
characteristics of the fillings of lis pendens notices by themselves. A visual examination of this
series seems to indicate a semi-continuous process: a month with a relatively high number of lis
pendens notices filed is frequently followed by a month with a relatively low number of lis
pendens notices filed. The resulting seesaw plot of the series may provide a clue regarding the
prevalent rejection of the null hypothesis of autocorrelation in the regression residuals. A
potential manipulation of these series through some sort of moving average or filtering process
could merit future research efforts.
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Figure 1: Delinquency Rate and 12-Month Moving Average
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Figure 2: Regional and National 30-Year Fixed Mortgage Interest Rates

16

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04

06

08

10

National Variable Interest Rate
Regional Variable Interest Rate

Figure 3: Regional and National 1-Year Variable Mortgage Interest Rates
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Figure 4: Unemployment Rate in McLean County
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Figure 5: Total Number of Unemployment Individuals in McLean County
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests
Sample period: June 1990: December 2011
Constant+trend
Variables in logarithms
The null hypothesis is non-stationarity
Delinquency rate
Unemployment rate
Unemployed
Fixed interest rate, regional
Fixed interest rate, national
Variable interest rate, regional
Variable interest rate, national
Critical values (%)
1
5
10

Significance

-3.8881
-2.3174
-2.2151
-3.2723
-3.2888
-1.5903
-1.7320

**

*
*

-3.9875
-3.4242
-3.1351

Variables in logarithms and first order
differences
The null hypothesis is non-stationarity
Delinquency rate
Unemployment rate
Unemployed
Fixed interest rate, regional
Fixed interest rate, national
Variable interest rate, regional
Variable interest rate, national
Critical values (%)
1
5
10

-11.18235
-3.6219
-3.8281
-12.8864
-12.8054
-14.8323
-10.3244

***
**
**
***
***
***
***

-3.9875
-3.4242
-3.1351

Table 1: Results of the ADF Test for Unit Roots
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Kwiatowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity tests
Sample period: June 1990: December 20
Constant+trend
Variables in logarithms
The null hypothesis is stationarity
Delinquency rate
Unemployment rate
Unemployed
Fixed interest rate, regional
Fixed interest rate, national
Variable interest rate, regional
Variable interest rate, national
Critical values (%)
1
5
10

0.3899
0.3755
0.3714
0.0765
0.0706
0.0859
0.0836

Significance

***
***
***
***

0.2160
0.1460
0.1190

Variables in logarithms and first order differences
The null hypothesis is stationarity
Delinquency rate
Unemployment rate
Unemployed
Fixed interest rate, regional
Fixed interest rate, national
Variable interest rate, regional
Variable interest rate, national
Critical values (%)
1
5
10

0.1223
0.0926
0.1076
0.0514
0.0485
0.0924
0.0845

**
***
***
***
***
***
***

0.2160
0.1460
0.1190

Table 2: Results of the KPSS Test for Stationarity
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Dependent variable: % ∆ in the Delinquency Rate (t=0)
n = 259
Model A

Constant
% ∆ in Delinquency Rate
(t - 1)

Model B

0.0139
0.0132
(0.4606)
(0.4375)
-0.3637*** -0.3628***
(-6.6027)
(-6.5951)
0.7675***
(2.7845)

% ∆ in Unemployed Population
(t - 4)
% ∆ in Unemployment Rate
(t - 4)

0.7022***
(2.6791)

Dummy variable
(January 1992)

-2.6546*** -2.6737***
(-5.4579)
(-5.5040)

R-squared
P (F-stat)
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values
White's test (heteroskedasticity)
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation)
Jarque-Bera (normality)

0.2292
0.0000

0.2309
0.0000

0.0960
0.0000
0.0158

0.0741
0.0000
0.0145

Table 3: Estimation Results: Model A and Model B.
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Dependent variable: % ∆ in the Delinquency Rate (t = 0)
n = 305

Constant

Model C

Model D

0.0258
(0.8340)

0.0223
(0.7287)

% ∆ in Delinquency Rate
(t - 1)

-0.3888*** -0.3853***
(-7.5430)
(-7.5220)

% ∆ in National Fixed Interest Rate
(t - 2)

2.7128***
(2.6631)

% ∆ in National Variable Interest Rate
(t - 3)

1.0225
(0.8562)

% ∆ in Regional Fixed Interest Rate
(t - 2)

2.2710***
(2.1401)

% ∆ in Regional Variable Interest Rate
(t -1)
Dummy variable
(January 1992)
R-squared
P (F-stat)
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values
White's test (heteroskedasticity)
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation)
Jarque-Bera (normality)

1.1483
(1.0855)
-2.6319***
(-4.9260)

-2.620***
(-4.9016)

0.2176
0.0000

0.2161
0.0000

0.1784
0.0000
0.0000

0.1893
0.0000
0.0000

Table 4: Estimation Results: Model C and Model D.
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Dependent variable: % ∆ in Delinquency Rate (t = 0)
n = 259
Model E

Constant

% ∆ in Delinquency Rate
(t - 1)

0.1963
(0.6506)
-0.3709***
(-6.7568)

% ∆ in Regional Fixed Interest rate
(t - 3)

1.8698**
(1.9049)

% ∆ in Number of Unemployed
(t - 4)

0.7854***
(2.8624)

Dummy variable
(January 1992)

-2.6450***
(-5.4704)

R-squared
P (F-stat)
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values
White's test (heteroskedasticity)
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation)
Jarque-Bera (normality)

0.2417
0.000
0.0703
0.0000
0.0075

Table 5: Estimation Results: Model E.
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